T

1. Interpretation – engagement is a positive increase of incentives.

Richard N. **Haas**, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, Former Senior Aide to President George Bush, **and** Meghan L. **O’Sullivan**, Fellow of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer **2k**, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>, TB

The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements.

1. Violation – affirmative is a negative increase of incentives, they take legislation away.
2. Explods limits – is functionally effectually topical, allows repealing of hundreds of individual bits of legislation we can’t link to.
3. Wide limits kill neg ground.

K

**American Hegemonic Dominance is Based On the Idea that Deep Down, Everyone in the World is an American Begging For American Style Democracy—Ultimately This Logic Justifies the Demonization of Opposition and Justifies All Violence in the Name of America**

Slavoj Zizek, 2004, “Iraq's False Promise,” Foreign Affairs, January/February, [www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=2442](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2442), Acc. 8-7-2004

**Americans have historically seen their role in the world in altruistic terms. “We just try to be good,” they say, “to help others, to bring peace and prosperity, and look what we get in return.” In fact, movies such as John Ford's The Searchers and Martin Scorsese's Taxi Driver**or books like Graham Greene's *The Quiet American*, **which provide fundamental insight into the naive benevolence of Americans, have never been more relevant than with today's global U.S. ideological offensive. As Greene said about his American protagonist, who sincerely wants to bring democracy and Western freedom to the Vietnamese, only to see his intentions totally misfire: “I never knew a man who had better motives for all the trouble he caused.**” **The supposition underlying these good intentions is that underneath our skins, we are all Americans. If that is humanity's true desire, then all that Americans need to do is to give people a chance, liberate them from their imposed constraints, and they will embrace America's ideological dream. No wonder the United States has moved from “containing” the enemy to promoting a “capitalist revolution**,” as Stephen Schwartz of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies put it in February 2003. **The United States is now, as the defunct Soviet Union was decades ago, the subversive agent of a world revolution.** But **when Bush said in his January 2003 State of the Union message, “The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity,” this apparent burst of humility, in fact, concealed its totalitarian opposite. Every totalitarian leader claims that, in himself, he is nothing at all: His strength is only the strength of the people who stand behind him**, whose deepest strivings only he expresses. **The catch is, those who oppose the leader by definition not only oppose him, but they also oppose the deepest and noblest strivings of the people**. And does the same not hold for Bush's claim? It would have been easier if freedom effectively were to be just the United States' gift to other nations; that way, those who oppose U.S. policies would merely be against the policies of a single nation-state. But **if freedom is God's gift to humanity, and the U.S. government sees itself as the chosen instrument for showering this gift on all the nations of the world, then those who oppose U.S. policies are rejecting the noblest gift of God to humanity.**

The Affirmative’s Logic Assigns to China Something We Cannot Access or Understand, Something in Them “More than Themselves”—This is the Basis for Racism and Hatred, a Structure That Inevitably Results in Total Violence

Slavoj Zizek, 1995, “Ideology between Fiction and Fantasy,” 16 Cardozo Law Review 1511, 1995, LN

Our argument can be briefly summarized as follows**: the outbreak of "real" violence is conditioned by a symbolic deadlock. Real violence is a kind of acting out that emerges when the symbolic fiction that guarantees the life of a community is in danger.** There is, however, a feature with regard to which the example of the Amazon gold diggers differs from the first two: in the first two examples, the disturbed fiction was a publicly unacknowledged, shadowy, obscene agency (Kafka's Court, the sailors' obscene initiation rituals), whereas in the Amazon gold-digger community the disturbance affected the symbolic fiction that determines the very structure of public authority**. The best way to elaborate this crucial difference is to approach the problem from the other end: what is the target of the outbursts of violence? What are we aiming at, what do we endeavor to annihilate when we exterminate Jews or beat up foreigners in our cities? The first answer that offers itself again involves symbolic fiction: is not, beyond direct physical pain and personal humiliation**, [\*1518] **the ultimate aim of the rapes in the Bosnian war, for example, to undermine the fiction (the symbolic narrative) that guarantees the coherence of the Muslim community? Is not a consequence of extreme violence also that "the story the community has been telling itself about itself no longer makes sense"** (to paraphrase Richard Rorty n8 )? **This destruction of the enemy's symbolic universe, this "culturocide," however, is in itself not sufficient to explain an outburst of ethnic violence - its ultimate cause (in the sense of driving force) is to be sought at a somewhat deeper level. What does our "intolerance" towards foreigners feed on? What is it that irritates us about them and disturbs our psychic balance? Already at the level of a simple phenomenological description, the crucial characteristic of this cause is that it cannot be pinpointed to some clearly defined observable property: although we usually can enumerate a series of features that annoy us with "them**" (the way they laugh too loudly, the bad smell of their food, etc.), **these features function as indicators of a more radical strangeness. Foreigners may look and act like us, but there is some unfathomable je ne sais quoi, something "in them more than themselves" that makes them "not quite human"** ("aliens" in the precise sense this term acquired in the science fiction films of the fifties). **Our relationship to this unfathomable traumatic element that "bothers us" in the Other is structured in fantasies** (about the Other's political and/or sexual omnipotence, about "their" strange sexual practices, about their secret hypnotic powers, etc.). **Jacques Lacan baptized this paradoxical uncanny object that stands for what in the perceived positive, empirical object necessarily eludes my gaze and as such serves as the driving force of my desiring it, objet petit a, the object-cause of desire; n9 another name for it is plus-de-jouir, the "surplus-enjoyment" that designates the excess over the satisfaction brought about by the positive, empirical properties of the object. At its most radical level, violence is precisely an endeavor to strike a blow at this unbearable surplus-enjoyment contained in the Other. Since hatred is thus not limited to the "actual properties" of its object but targets its real kernel, objet a, what is "in the object more than itself," the object of hatred is stricto sensu indestructible: the more we destroy the object in reality, the more powerful its sublime kernel rises in front of us. This paradox has already [\*1519] emerged apropos of the Jews in Nazi Germany: the more they were ruthlessly exterminated, the more horrifying were the dimensions acquired by the remainder...**

The Fantasies Created By the Affirmative Structure are Ultimately False, The Response To Such Failures is the Inevitable Violence Which Attempts to Bridge the Gap Between the Everyday World and the Belief Which Undermines The Affirmative

Zizek 2002 [Slavoj, “Welcome to the Desert of the Real,” The Symptom Issue 2, Spring 2002, [www.lacan.com/desertsym.htm acc. 8-20-04](http://www.lacan.com/desertsym.htm%20acc.%208-20-04)]

As Badiou demonstrated apropos of the Stalinist show trials, this violent effort to distill the pure Real from the elusive reality necessarily ends up in its opposite, in the obsession with pure appearance: in the Stalinist universe, the passion of the Real (ruthless enforcement of the Socialist development) thus culminates in ritualistic stagings of a theatrical spectacle in the truth of which no one believes. The key to this reversal resides in the ultimate impossibility to draw a clear distinction between deceptive reality and some firm positive kernel of the Real: every positive bit of reality is a priori suspicious, since (as we know from Lacan) the Real Thing is ultimately another name for the Void. The pursuit of the Real thus equals total annihilation, a (self)destructive fury within which the only way to trace the distinction between the semblance and the Real is, precisely, to STAGE it in a fake spectacle. The fundamental illusion is here that, once the violent work of purification is done, the New Man will emerge ex nihilo, freed from the filth of the past corruption. Within this horizon, "really-existing men" are reduced to the stock of raw material which can be ruthlessly exploited for the construction of the new - the Stalinist revolutionary definition of man is a circular one: "man is what is to be crushed, stamped on, mercilessly worked over, in order to produce a new man." We have here the tension between the series of "ordinary" elements ("ordinary" men as the "material" of history) and the exceptional "empty" element (the socialist "New Man," which is at first nothing but an empty place to be filled up with positive content through the revolutionary turmoil). In a revolution, there is no a priori positive determination of this New Man: a revolution is not legitimized by the positive notion of what Man's essence, "alienated" in present conditions and to be realized through the revolutionary process, is - the only legitimization of a revolution is negative, a will to break with the Past. One should formulate here things in a very precise way: the reason why the Stalinist fury of purification is so destructive resides in the very fact that it is sustained by the belief that, after the destructive work of purification will be accomplished, SOMETHING WILL REMAIN, the sublime "indivisible remainder," the paragon of the New. It is in order to conceal the fact that there is nothing beyond that, in a strictly perverse way, the revolutionary has to cling to violence as the only index of his authenticity, and it is as this level that the critics of Stalinism as a rule misperceive the cause of the Communist's attachment to the Party. Say, when, in 1939-1941 pro-Soviet Communists twice had to change their Party line overnight (after the Soviet-German pact, it was imperialism, not, Fascism, which was elevated to the role of the main enemy; from June 22 1941, when Germany attacked Soviet Union, it was again the popular front against the Fascist beast), the brutality of the imposed changes of position was what attracted them. Along the same lines, the purges themselves exerted an uncanny fascination, especially on intellectuals: their "irrational" cruelty served as a kind of ontological proof, bearing witness to the fact that we are dealing with the Real, not just with empty plans - the Party is ruthlessly brutal, so it means business...

Our Alternative is To Reject the Idea Implicit in the Affirmative that One Must Identify Within the Boundaries of the System. By Choosing the Third Way Politics Refuses to Acknowledge, We Realign Our Symbolic Fantasies with the Ethics of the Real, Rupturing the Fantasy We Have Chosen to Call Reality and Creating New Possibilities.

Glyn Daly, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University College Northampton, [Risking the Impossible](http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm" \t "top), Lacan.com 2004 (<http://www.lacan.com/zizek-primer.htm>)

Zizek is concerned to confront this alibi head on and to oppose it with an ethics of the Real (see also Zupancic, 2000). This is an ethics in which we assume responsibility for our own actions and our inscription within the broader life-world up to and including the construction of socio-economic reality. This is not to embrace any kind of carte blanche approach to reality. The point is rather that we should address the full implications of the way in which our reality is reproduced in human terms and not as a cosmic order. We cannot hide behind terms like "globalisation", "pragmatism", "economic reality", "rationality" and so on,as if they described a neutral ontological order. On the contrary, we are obliged to confront the way in which such terms attempt to ideologically disguise the artificial nature of reality (this grimace of the Real) and, on that very basis, to make real (Real) ethical decisions: i.e. decisions that begin from the position that genuine transformation is always possible and always involves this traumatic dimension of the Real; this dimension of rupture with existing symbolic structures. An ethics of the Real is not one of accepting impossibility in the sense of an indefinite ideal, but is rather one that entreats us to risk the impossible: to break out of the bonds of existing possibility. This opens the way to what Zizek refers to as the act and to overcome the symbolic mortification associated with the ideological-cynical attitude that revolves around, a fetishized notion of absolute reality. The Third Wayist perspective, for example, is largely stupefied by its master signifier "globalisation" and is consequently unable to mount any real challenge to the basic power structures. Global (capitalist) reality is in place, so it is chiefly a question of adjustment and of adopting a mature-pragmatic attitude. Politics is reduced to a repetitive logic of deliberation rather than active resistance; a politics of conformism towards a determinate order of reality rather than a reconfiguration of that reality. Like Hamlet, Third Wayism remains transfixed by the spectre of impossibility (the global Thing) and this renders it incapable of risking the impossible; of passing to the act. Zizek's thought is concerned crucially to reactivate the dimension of the miraculous in political endeavour. For Zizek the miracle is that which coincides with trauma in the sense that it involves a fundamental moment of symbolic disintegration (2001b: 86). This is the mark of the act: a basic rupture in the weave of reality that opens up new possibilities and creates the space for a reconfiguration of reality itself. Like the miracle, the act is ultimately unsustainable - it cannot be reduced to, or incorporated directly within, the symbolic order. Yet it is through the act that we touch (and are touched by) the Real in such a way that the bonds of our symbolic universe are broken and that an alternative construction is enabled; reality is transformed in a Real sense.

XO

XOs cut through partisanship to promote progressive goals, often catalyze congress and result in legislation

Dr. Benjmain K. **Sovacool**, Research Fellow, Genergy Governance Program, Centre on Asia and Globalization and Assistant Professor, National University of Singapore and Kelly E. Sovacool, Senior Research Associate, National University of Singapore, “Preventing National Electricity-Water Crises Areas in the United States,” COLUMBIA JOURNAL F ENVIRONMENTAL LAW v. 34 n. 2, 20**09**, p. 387-388.

In this type of a situation, when entrenched interests and shortsightedness have bogged down policymaking, Presidential action can promote progressive change and justice. Thomas Jefferson issued an Executive Order in 1803 to complete the Louisiana Purchase; President Lincoln issued an Executive Order in 1863 to free the slaves (an action later known as the “Emancipation Proclamation”); President Truman used an Executive Order to force the racial integration of the armed forces; President Eisenhower used one to force all federal contractors to post public notice of their nondiscrimination in hiring; Presidents Kennedy and Johnson used Executive Orders to require affirmative action in federal contracting and to ban racial discrimination in federal housing; and President Nixon used an Executive Order to create the EPA. In each of these circumstances, Executive Orders were used to cut through partisanship and implement important and needed changes. Furthermore, such Executive Orders often catalyzed media and public attention to the degree that they later persuaded Congress to endorse with eventual legislation. Bruce N. Reed, a special advisor to President Clinton, put it succinctly by stating that “in our experience, when the administration takes executive action, it not only leads to results while the political process is stuck in neutral, but it often spurs Congress to follow suit.” Analogously, Executive Orders, notes two political scientists, “facilitate innovations in the legislative process, codify ideological commitments, and drive social change.”

XO solves best- 5 reasons

**Pauly and Lansford 3** (Robert and Tom, professor of history and political Science at Norwich University and assistant professor of political science, University of Southern Mississippi, American Diplomacy, “National Security Policy and the Strong Executive: The French and American Presidents and the War on Terror”, June, 2003 http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives\_roll/2003\_04-06/lansfordpauly\_exec/lansfordpauly\_exec.html) SC

France and the United States have presidential systems which give their nations’ highest elected official wide powers to conduct foreign and security policy. To different degrees, the division of responsibilities for both nations’ highest office reflects Wildavsky’s concept of “two-presidencies” in which one facet represents domestic policy and one represents foreign policy.1 In writing about the U.S. chief executive, Wildavsky summarized contemporary scholarship on the foreign policy powers of the presidency and identified five main reasons for the concentration of power: 1) since foreign policy and security issues often need “fast action”, the executive rather than the legislative branch of government is the more appropriate decision-making structure; 2) the Constitution grants the president broad formal powers; 3) because of the complexities involved voters tend to delegate to the president their “trust and confidence” to act; 4) the “interest group structure is weak, unstable and thin”; and 5) the legislature follows a “self-denying ordinance” since tradition and practicality reinforce the power of the chief executive.2 Wildavsky’s work is echoed by many scholars, including Logan, who contends that in Western democracies, “the mass public consciously or unconsciously cedes influence” to politicians and policy elites.3

Counterplan increases presidential power—Congress will fail to take it back

Laurie L. **Rice**, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Southern Illinois University, “Statements of Power: Presidential Use of Statements of Administration Policy and Signing Statements in the Legislative Process,” PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY v. 40 n. 4, 12—**10**, pp. 686-707.

Presidential power has expanded over time as presidents have asserted new prerogatives and built on the precedents of their predecessors. We have seen this in the areas of presidential commitment of troops, executive orders, and impoundments, to name a few. Presidents push, and when Congress fails to respond to the expansion of power, subsequent presidents take it as accepted precedent and build on it.

Strong presidency key to solving terror, nuclear war, and economy

Thomas E. **Cronin and** Michael A. **Genovese**, THE PARADOXES OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 19**98**.

A central question during the 1970s was whether, in the wake of a somewhat diminished presidency, Congress could furnish the necessary leadership to govern the country. Most people, including many members of Congress, did not think Congress could play that role. The routine answer as we enter the twenty-first century is that the United States needs a presidency of substantial power, if we are to solve the trade, deficit, productivity, and other economic and national security problems we currently face. We live in a continuous state of emergency. Terrorism or nuclear warfare could destroy our country. Global competition of almost every sort highlights the need for swift leadership and a certain amount of efficiency in government. Many people realize, too, that weakening the presidency may, as often as not, strengthen the vast federal bureaucracy and its influence over how programs are implemented more than it would strengthen Congress. Congress simply is not structured for sustained leadership and direction. Power in Congress is too fragmented and dispersed. Congress can, on occasion, provide leadership on various issues, yet it is far less able to adapt to changing demands and antional or international crises that arise than is the presidency. The presidency is a more fluid situation and thereby can usually more quickly adjust and adapt.

DA

#### Obama is focused on financial issues – political capital will be key and is working now

Jonathan Allen, Politico, 9/19/13, GOP battles boost President Obama, dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=17961849-5BE5-43CA-B1BC-ED8A12A534EB

There’s a simple reason President Barack Obama is using his bully pulpit to focus the nation’s attention on the battle over the budget: In this fight, he’s watching Republicans take swings at each other. And that GOP fight is a lifeline for an administration that had been scrambling to gain control its message after battling congressional Democrats on the potential use of military force in Syria and the possible nomination of Larry Summers to run the Federal Reserve. If House Republicans and Obama can’t cut even a short-term deal for a continuing resolution, the government’s authority to spend money will run out on Oct. 1. Within weeks, the nation will default on its debt if an agreement isn’t reached to raise the federal debt limit. For some Republicans, those deadlines represent a leverage point that can be used to force Obama to slash his health care law. For others, they’re a zero hour at which the party will implode if it doesn’t cut a deal. Meanwhile, “on the looming fiscal issues, Democrats — both liberal and conservative, executive and congressional — are virtually 100 percent united,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.). Just a few days ago, all that Obama and his aides could talk about were Syria and Summers. Now, they’re bringing their party together and shining a white hot light on Republican disunity over whether to shut down the government and plunge the nation into default in a vain effort to stop Obamacare from going into effect. The squabbling among Republicans has gotten so vicious that a Twitter hashtag — #GOPvsGOPugliness — has become a thick virtual data file for tracking the intraparty insults. Moderates, and even some conservatives, are slamming Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, a tea party favorite, for ramping up grassroots expectations that the GOP will shut down the government if it can’t win concessions from the president to “defund” his signature health care law. “I didn’t go to Harvard or Princeton, but I can count,” Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) tweeted, subtly mocking Cruz’s Ivy League education. “The defunding box canyon is a tactic that will fail and weaken our position.” While it is well-timed for the White House to interrupt a bad slide, Obama’s singular focus on the budget battle is hardly a last-minute shift. Instead, it is a return to the narrative arc that the White House was working to build before the Syria crisis intervened. And it’s so important to the president’s strategy that White House officials didn’t consider postponing Monday’s rollout of the most partisan and high-stakes phase even when a shooter murdered a dozen people at Washington’s Navy Yard that morning. The basic storyline, well under way over the summer, was to have the president point to parts of his agenda, including reducing the costs of college and housing, designed to strengthen the middle class; use them to make the case that he not only saved the country from economic disaster but is fighting to bolster the nation’s finances on both the macro and household level; and then argue that Republicans’ desire to lock in the sequester and leverage a debt-ceiling increase for Obamacare cuts would reverse progress made. The president is on firm ground, White House officials say, because he stands with the public in believing that the government shouldn’t shut down and that the country should pay its bills.

#### Plan destroys Obama’s credibility – makes it impossible for him to get anything through Congress

Seeking Alpha 9-10, 9-10-2013, “Syria Could Upend Debt Ceiling Fight,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/1684082-syria-could-upend-debt-ceiling-fight

Unless President Obama can totally change a reluctant public's perception of another Middle-Eastern conflict, it seems unlikely that he can get 218 votes in the House, though he can probably still squeak out 60 votes in the Senate. This defeat would be totally unprecedented as a President has never lost a military authorization vote in American history. To forbid the Commander-in-Chief of his primary power renders him all but impotent. At this point, a rebuff from the House is a 67%-75% probability. I reach this probability by looking within the whip count. I assume the 164 declared "no" votes will stay in the "no" column. To get to 218, Obama needs to win over 193 of the 244 undecided, a gargantuan task. Within the "no" column, there are 137 Republicans. Under a best case scenario, Boehner could corral 50 "yes" votes, which would require Obama to pick up 168 of the 200 Democrats, 84%. Many of these Democrats rode to power because of their opposition to Iraq, which makes it difficult for them to support military conflict. The only way to generate near unanimity among the undecided Democrats is if they choose to support the President (recognizing the political ramifications of a defeat) despite personal misgivings. The idea that all undecided Democrats can be convinced of this argument is relatively slim, especially as there are few votes to lose. In the best case scenario, the House could reach 223-225 votes, barely enough to get it through. Under the worst case, there are only 150 votes. Given the lopsided nature of the breakdown, the chance of House passage is about one in four. **While a failure in the House would put action against Syria in limbo, I have felt that the market has overstated the impact of a strike there**, which would be limited in nature. Rather, **investors should focus on the profound ripple through the power structure in Washington, which would greatly impact impending battles over** spending and **the debt ceiling**. Currently, **the government** loses spending authority on September 30 while it **hits the debt ceiling by the middle of October. Markets have generally felt that Washington will once again strike a last-minute deal and avert total catastrophe**. Failure in the Syrian vote could change this**. For the Republicans to beat Obama on a President's strength (foreign military action), they will likely be emboldened that they can beat him on domestic spending issues.**  **Until now, consensus has been that the two sides would compromise** to fund the government at sequester levels while **passing a $1 trillion stand**

#### Obama is key to avoid shutdown that kills the economy and hegemony

Norm Ornstein, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 9/1/13, Showdowns and Shutdowns, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/01/showdowns\_and\_shutdowns\_syria\_congress\_obama

Then there is the overload of business on the congressional agenda when the two houses return on Sept. 9 -with only nine legislative days scheduled for action in the month. We have serious confrontations ahead on spending bills and the debt limit, as the new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1 and the debt ceiling approaches just a week or two thereafter. Before the news that we would drop everything for an intense debate on whether to strike militarily in Syria, Congress-watchers were wondering how we could possibly deal with the intense bargaining required to avoid one or more government shutdowns and/or a real breach of the debt ceiling, with devastating consequences for American credibility and the international economy. Beyond the deep policy and political divisions, Republican congressional leaders will likely use both a shutdown and the debt ceiling as hostages to force the president to cave on their demands for deeper spending cuts. Avoiding this end-game bargaining will require the unwavering attention of the same top leaders in the executive and legislative branches who will be deeply enmeshed i/////////n the Syria debate. The possibility -even probability -of disruptions caused by partial shutdowns could complicate any military actions. The possibility is also great that the rancor that will accompany the showdowns over fiscal policy will bleed over into the debate about America and Syria.

China

1) Chinese war would not go nuclear

Jeffrey Record (Professor of Strategy and International Security at the Air War College) 01 “Thinking about China and War”, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/win01/record.html#record

Assuming the absence of mindless escalation to a general nuclear exchange, a war between China and the United States would be constrained by limited military capacity and political objectives. For openers, neither China nor the United States is capable of invading and subjugating the other, and even if the United States had the ability to do so, avoidance of a land war on the Asian mainland has long been an injunction of American strategy. The objectives of a Sino-American war over Taiwan or freedom of navigation in the South China Sea would be limited—just as they were in the Sino-American war in Korea. And since the outcome in either case would be decided by naval and air forces, with regular ground forces relegated to a distinctly secondary role, a war over Taiwan or the South China Sea would also be limited in terms of the type of force employed. This was not the case in the Korean War, in which ground combat dominated. (To be sure, the US position on the ground would have been untenable without air dominance.)

SECOND, If nuclear escalation occurred the US would decapitate Chinese nuclear forces before China could use them – no risk of bilateral escalation

Hans Kristensen et al (Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists) 06 “Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning”, November, Pg. 2-3

Our principal finding is that the Chinese-U.S. nuclear relationship is dramatically disproportionate in favor of the United States and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Although the United States has maintained extensive nuclear strike plans against Chinese targets for more than a half century, China has never responded by building large nuclear forces of its own and is unlikely to do so in the future. As a result, Chinese nuclear weapons are quantitatively and qualitatively much inferior to their U.S. counterparts: China’s total stockpile numbers around 200 warheads; the United States has nearly 10,000. By 2015, after China deploys a new generation of ballistic missiles and the United States has completed its planned reductions, China may have some 220 warheads and the United States more than 5,000. China has about 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the continental United States; the United States has more than 830 missiles – most with multiple warheads – that can reach China. By 2015, when the U.S. intelligence community projects China will have 75 missiles primarily targeted against the United States, the U.S. force will include 780 land- and sea-based missiles. None of China’s long-range nuclear forces are believed to be on alert; most U.S. ballistic missiles are on high alert ready to launch within minutes after receiving a launch order. By 2015, unlike today, some of China’s long-range missiles presumably might deploy with their warheads mated but be incapable of quickly launching on warning. China’s sole nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) has never gone on patrol. As a result, the crews of the new Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs currently under construction will need to start almost from scratch to develop the operational and tactical skills and procedures that are essential if a sea-based deterrent is to be militarily effective and matter strategically. In comparison, U.S. SSBNs have conducted more than 3,600 deterrent patrols over the past 55 years. In 2005, the United States conducted 44 patrols, more than four times the number of SSBN patrols conducted by all other nuclear weapon states combined. China may be able to build two or three new SSBNs over the next decade, but they would be highly vulnerable to U.S. anti-submarine forces; the U.S. Navy has 14 SSBNs and has moved the majority of them into the Pacific, where they operate with impunity. China may have a small number of aircraft with a secondary nuclear capability, but they would be severely tested by U.S. and allied air defense systems or in air-to-air combat. The United States operates 72 long-range bombers assigned missions with nuclear gravity bombs and land-attack cruise missiles. China does not have nuclear cruise missiles, although the U.S. intelligence community suspects it might develop such a capability in the future. The United States has more than 1,000 nuclear cruise missiles for delivery by aircraft and attack submarines.

THIRD--Modernization

A) War with China would completely reverse its modernization and would cause the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party

Owen Harries (Think tank, Author, and Editor of the National Interest) 02 China in the National Interest, Transaction Publishers, ISBN 0-7658-0561-8, p. 248

The strategic costs to China of a war with the United States are only part of the deterrence equation. China also possesses vital economic interests in stable relations with the United States. War would end China's quest for modernization by severely constraining its access to U.S. markets, capital, and technology, and by requiring China to place its economy on permanent wartime footing. The resultant economic reversal would derail China's quest for "comprehensive national power" and great power status.///////// Serious economic instability would also destabilize China's political system on account of the break down of social order. Both would probably impose insurmountable challenges to party leadership. Moreover, defeat in a war with the United States over Taiwan would impose devastating nationalistic humiliation on the Chinese Communist Party. In all, the survival of the party depends on preventing a Sino-America war.

B) Continued Chinese modernization will collapse U.S. Hegemony

Meghan O’Connell (Writer for UPI News) June 22 06 “China Threatens to Rival American Power Status”, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/China\_Threatens\_To\_Rival\_American\_Power\_Status.html

China's rapid military expansion over recent years has sparked concern amongst American officials that its battlefield capabilities may eventually pose a threat to U.S. dominance. Experts recently met at the Heritage Foundation to discuss the Pentagon's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and its implications for the U.S. strategy with China. The Pentagon report states, "Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages... The pace and scope of China's military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk." Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Larry Wortzel said, "The United States and Western countries in general face a concerted effort on the part of the Chinese military to build this new defense infrastructure, and they're pretty good at it." Military modernization in China has accelerated since the 1990s. China has increased its defense spending by more than 10 percent in real terms every year except 2003 since 1996, the defense review says. China's stated defense budget for 2006 increased by 15 percent from last year to $35 billion. However, the Pentagon report says that the actual budget is between $70 billion and $135 billion dollars. But China lagged far behind the United States in the CIA's estimates of each country's military expenditures in 2005. The CIA estimates the United States spent over $518 billion last year, while China's estimated total hovered around $81 billion. China cannot realistically catch up with the U.S. military budget, said Wang Yuan-kang, a professor at the National Chengchi University in Taiwan and visiting fellow at the Brookings Institute. And America remains a larger economic force. "China does not like American troops at its footsteps," Wang said, "and it wants to have a multi-power world but it cannot do it now because the United States is simply too powerful." But the gap between America's dominance and China's power seems to be lessening. The debate is no longer about whether China has the military strength to pose a threat, but what to do about it, said Daniel Blumenthal, commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. "China is probably the only country in the world that can compete with the United States militarily and actually pose a challenge to its hege/////mony," Blumenthal said, pointing to what he called a serious peacetime military buildup by China over the last 10 years. The United States has been shoring up its alliances around the region, he continued, with countries such as Japan, India, Vietnam and Mongolia all concerned about what China's military rise means. Because of the nation's military expansion, intervention should China attack Taiwan can no longer be accomplished at a low cost, said Randall Schriver, former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. And though China has been bulking up its military presence along borders near Taiwan, Schriver said that the nation's vision extends far beyond the small island to regional and global contingencies. "The game is on in Asia, and the United States has to be engaged," Schriver said, emphasizing the growing global importance of Asia. According to the National Intelligence Council, Schriver said, by 2020, Asia will hold 56 percent of the world's population, six of the 10 largest militaries, three of the four largest economies, and six of the 10 largest energy consumers. By contrast, Schriver added, the NIC expects the population of the Middle East to compose only 4 percent of the world's total in 2020. "The whole center of gravity of the earth and human existence is moving to Asia," Schriver said, explaining that the United States needs a policy that will develop relations with the rest of Asia while confronting China. You get Asia right by getting China right and you get China right by getting Asia right, Schriver said. Yet in an age of globalization, any moves by China or the United States would have grand influence in areas beyond the military. "Economic setbacks and crises of confidence could slow China's emergence as a full-scale great power," the National Intelligence Council wrote in its 2020 Project report on global trends for the future. "Beijing's failure to maintain its economic growth would itself have a global impact."

C) U.S. hegemony is key to prevent global nuke war

Zalmay Khalilzad (Senior Policy analyst at the RAND Institute) 95 "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War", Spring Washington Quarterly

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

FOURTH, war with China is inevitable – quick war now is better than a massive war in the long-term

JR Nyquist (Former Contractor in Soviet/Russian Analysis Group for U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency) 05

“China Relvelations”

China’s war preparations are deliberate, and the implications should not be passed over lightly. China is a highly secretive country, like all communist countries. The objective of communism is world revolution, the overthrow of global capitalism, the destruction of the free market, the elimination of the international bourgeoisie and the disarming of the United States. We should be puzzled, indeed, if Chinese policy did not follow the communist line (however deviously). Given all this, it is difficult to account for the dismissive attitude of U.S. intelligence experts when regarding Chinese intentions. The China problem is a serious one. “The people … of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America should unite,” said Chairman Mao in 1964. “The people of all continents should unite … and so form the broadest united front to oppose the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war and to defend world peace.” In terms of today’s peace movement, Mao’s sentiments are up-to-date. They are, I think, a founding inspiration. The supposed “death of communism” may have eliminated a few soiled terms, but not the main idea. The label on old hatreds may be changed, but the content remains the same. And because America is asleep, and the market is buzzing with Chinese goods, the U.S. government has turned a blind eye. The truth about China is worse than inconvenient. It is painful. So a special context has been devised for dismissing inconvenient facts. This context is inculcated at graduate schools, think tanks and in government. The context for understanding international affairs must not admit the existence of a coordinated, secretive and dangerous combination of countries motivated to overthrow the United States. In other words, the existence of a “communist bloc” cannot be admitted. And China’s role within this bloc – above all – must be rated as a “crackpot notion.” And yet, the existence of something identical to the old communist bloc – whatever we choose to call it – is indicated by actions across the board by Russia, the East European satellite countries, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and China. Some ideas fall from fashion. But truth is always true, fashion or not. U.S. experts failed to connect the dots regarding China’s development of a long-range cruise missile, a new attack submarine, new ground-to-air missiles, a new anti-ship missile (for sinking U.S. aircraft carriers) and more. China is preparing for war against the United States, specifically. As absurd as it sounds to the economic optimists who think trade with China guarantees peace, the U.S. and China are bound to collide. Anyone who thinks otherwise doesn’t have a sense of history, doesn’t understand communist thinking or the overall policy Beijing has consistently followed since 1949. Communist countries periodically experiment with capitalism, they always seek trade with the West, and they always sink the money and technology they gain thereby into a military buildup. Ultimately, they don’t care about the prosperity of their people, the state of the national infrastructure, personal or press freedom. Some believe that we mustn’t say that China is a threat. Such a statement would be akin to self-fulfilling prophecy. But an honest appreciation of Chinese actions should not be disallowed by an appeasing diplomacy or wishful thinking. The job of the analyst is not to guarantee good relations with countries that are preparing for destructive war. The job of the analyst is to see war preparations, diplomatic maneuvers and economic policies and draw a common sense conclusion about them. If world peace depends on hiding China’s military buildup, then world peace is like your fat uncle dressed in a Santa Claus suit. Saying it’s your fat uncle may ruin Christmas for your little sister, but Santa Claus isn’t a real person – and never will be.

FIFTH, War with China NOW is key to stimulate the U.S. economy

Paul Watson and Yihan Dai (Analyst for Infowars & Chinese Translator for Infowars) October 30 08 “RAND Lobbies Pentagon: Start War to Save U.S. Economy” http://www.infowars.com/?p=5654)

According to reports out of top Chinese mainstream news outlets, the RAND Corporation recently presented a shocking proposal to the Pentagon in which it lobbied for a war to be started with a major foreign power in an attempt to stimulate the American economy and prevent a recession. A fierce debate has now ensued in China about who that foreign power may be, with China itself as well as Russia and even Japan suspected to be the targets of aggression. The reports cite French media news sources as having uncovered the proposal, in which RAND suggested that the $700 billion dollars that has been earmarked to bailout Wall Street and failing banks instead be used to finance a new war which would in turn re-invigorate the flagging stock markets. The RAND Corporation is a notoriously powerful NGO with deep ties to the U.S. military-industrial complex as well as interlocking connections with the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie foundations. Current directors of RAND include Frank Charles Carlucci III, former Defense Secretary and Deputy Director of the CIA, Ronald L. Olson, Council on Foreign Relations luminary and former Secretary of Labor, and Carl Bildt, top Bilderberg member and former Swedish Prime Minister. Carlucci was chairman of the Carlyle Group from 1989-2005 and oversaw gargantuan profits the defense contractor made in the aftermath of 9/11 following the invasion of Afghanistan. The Carlyle Group has also received investment money from the Bin Laden family. Reportedly, the RAND proposal brazenly urged that a new war could be launched to benefit the economy, but stressed that the target country would have to be a major influential power, and not a smaller country on the scale of Afghanistan or Iraq.

Economic collapse causes extinction

Tom Bearden 2K

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

Prolif

New proliferators not more likely to use weapons/warfight—nukes decrease frequency and intensity of wars—4 reasons.

(1) deterrence induces caution.

(2) wars will be limited.

(3) proportional punishments.

(4) use sparks rapid de-escalation.

Kenneth N. **Waltz**, Adjunct Professor, Columbia University, Professor Emeritus, UC-Berkeley, THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A DEBATE RENEWED, with Scott D. Sagan, 20**03**, p.36-37.

Does the spread of nuclear weapons threaten to make wars more intense at regional levels, where wars of high intensity have been possible for many years? If weaker countries are unable to defend at lesser levels of violence, might they destroy themselves through resorting to nuclear weapons? Lesser nuclear states live in fear of this possibility. But this is not different from the fear under which the United States and the Soviet Union lived for years. Small nuclear states may experience a keen sense of desperation because of vulnerability to conventional as well as to nuclear attack, but, again, in desperate situations what all parties become most desperate to avoid is the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Still, however improbable the event, lesser states may one day fire some of their weapons. Are minor nuclear states more or less likely to do so than major ones? The answer to this question is vitally important because the existence of some states would be at stake even if the damage done were regionally confined.

For a number of reasons, deterrent strategies promise less damage than war-fighting strategies. First, deterrent strategies induce caution all around and thus reduce the incidence of war. Second, wars fought in the face of strategic nuclear weapons must be carefully limited because a country having them may retaliate if its vital interests are threatened. Third, prospective punishment need only be proportionate to an adversary's expected gains in war after those gains are discounted for the many uncertainties of war. Fourth, should deterrence fail, a few judiciously delivered warheads are likely to produce sobriety in the leaders of all of the countries involved and thus bring rapid de-escalation//////. Finally, war-fighting strategies offer no clear place to stop short of victory for some and defeat for others. Deterrent strategies do, and that place is where one country threatens another's vital interests. . Deterrent strategies lower the probability that wars will begin. If wars start nevertheless, deterrent strategies lower the probability that they will be carried very far.

In a conventional world, to deter an attacker a status quo country must threaten a lot of force. It must do so to overcome doubts about the credibility of conventional threats and uncertainty about the effectiveness of conventional blows. In a nuclear world to deter one need threaten only a little force because so much more can easily be added. Limiting wars in a conventional world has proved difficult. In a nuclear world, only limited wars can be fought. In a conventional world, states are tempted to strike first to gain an initial advantage and set the course of the war. In a nuclear world, to strike first is pointless because no advantage can be gained against invulnerable forces. In a conventional world, combatants use their best, i.e. their most destructive, weapons. Although overlooked, this explains our use of atomic bombs in the Second World War. From Guadalcanal to Iwo Jima to Okinawa to the fire-bombing of Tokyo, America applied force on an ever-increasing scale. In the context of a conventional war, A-bombs looked simply like bigger and better weapons. The aim in a conventional war is to escalate to a higher level of force than your opponent can reach. In a nuclear world, no one can escalate to a level of force anywhere near the top without risking its own destruction. Deterrence in World War II worked only where combatants shared the ability to use a horrible weapon, poison gas. All of the major combatants were capable of using it. None did. On all of the above counts, nuclear weapons reverse the logic of war that operates in conventional worlds.

Nuclear weapons lessen the intensity as well as the frequency of war among their possessors. For fear of escalation, nuclear states do not want to fight long and hard over important interests-indeed, they do not want to fight at all. Minor nuclear states have even better reasons than major ones to accommodate one another and to avoid fighting. Worries about the intensity of war among nuclear states have to be viewed in this context and against a world in which conven- tional weapons have become ever costlier and more destructive.